

School is a celebrated skill center offering free instruction to students of any age.

In these cities, vocational education has, for various reasons, become a matter of major local concern and is vigorously supported by the community. Such sporadic local achievements are widely and justly publicized. But this acclaim is unfortunate if it diverts attention from the central fact, namely this: Unless interest in vocational education is awakened on a massive national scale, the United States will lose a crucial lap in "the race between education and catastrophe"—in H. G. Wells' annually more apt definition of history.

Unemployment is both a prime cause and a symptom of the country's alarming economic torpor. Recent economic studies, stemming from the work of Arthur Burns of the National Bureau of Economic Research and from the University of Chicago's Milton Friedman, demonstrate that investment in education rivals investment in physical capital (factories, machinery) in stimulating economic growth. Walter Heller, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, has said that such investment in "human capital" has accounted for half of our economic growth in the 20th century.

Now this hardly seems too difficult a concept for the American people or even Congress to grasp and to act upon. But maybe homelier considerations can be more compelling: the fact, for example, that the loss in production in the United States caused by unemployment in 1962 was greater than the loss caused by the strikes in the last 35 years; or that, to the average man, the loss of only 1 year's income due to unemployment is more than the total cost of 12 years of education through high school. However one may dramatize the issue, the essential point is that education, employment, and economic growth are inextricably linked. Today rational education must include training pertinent for the 80 percent of all young Americans who enter the labor market without college degrees. To ignore their vocational training is a reverse twist on the Eskimos' fabled custom of pushing their unproductive senior citizens onto the icepack. That practice at least has a certain economic logic. Our system is managing to be at once inhumane and economically suicidal.

HOW THE KREMLIN CAPTURED CUBA

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I should like to call to the attention of all those who may not have yet heard about it a remarkable and highly readable book on Cuba called "The Great Deception," by James Monahan, a Reader's Digest senior editor, and Kenneth O. Gilmore, an associate editor. I urge all those who want a gripping, up-to-date and authoritative account of exactly how the Kremlin took over Cuba to read this book which has recently been published by Farrar, Straus & Co. The significant fact about "The Great Deception" is that it covers, as does no other book, the Communist deception in Cuba from the day Castro took power on January 1, 1959, up through last fall's missile crisis and its aftermath. Innumerable items in this publication will be both fascinating and eye opening to anyone who reads it. For example, there is a frightening look at how the Communists seized control of the labor unions in Cuba.

Another portion provides a chilling account of the "Bag of Pigs" invasion disaster through the eyes of those inside Cuba.

This reveals that the underground tragically knew less about the invasion plan than Castro and his Communist agents. There is also a vast amount of unpublished and dramatic material on the Castro Communist effort to infect and take over Latin America through propaganda, infiltration and subversion, all of which will convince many that our efforts today to cut off this activity from the Cuban base will be next to impossible until that base is eliminated. Moreover, the book lays out the full picture of the Soviet military intrusion in Cuba which actually began in late 1960 and built up to Moscow's implantation of troops and missiles.

A key reason for the superb quality of this book lies in the fact that for nearly a year Monahan and Gilmore headed a Reader's Digest task force which made an in-depth study of the Sovietization of Castro's Cuba. Hundreds of Cubans, many still living in the police state, were interviewed at length; their personal stories were tape recorded, and later analyzed and checked out to establish absolute authenticity.

It is for this reason, perhaps, that reaction to the book by leading free Cubans has been so laudatory. And, of course, those Cubans who lost their country to Soviet imperialism are best qualified to judge the accuracy and quality of a book describing their tragedy.

Allow me, therefore, to present some comments by outstanding Cubans in exile that have been received by the publishers of the book.

Manuel Artime, civilian leader of the valiant Cuban invasion brigade who just last December was released from Castro's prison, has said:

As one who lived through some of the key phases of the Kremlin's takeover of Cuba, I can attest that "The Great Deception" is one of the best accounts yet written on Communist Cuba.

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, who heads the Revolutionary Council of Cuba:

"The Great Deception" is an example of the tragedy of Cuba, which is the tragedy of America. This book aids effectively in understanding this through the expository force of the facts which it relates, and the clear and precise form in which they are presented. I thank the authors, as a Cuban, for the intensity with which they have felt the drama of my country; and I hope, as a Spanish-American, that the book will be read carefully by the Government and people of the United States in order that they will understand the true nature and extent of the danger which this holds for the liberty of our hemisphere.

Dr. Oscar de la Vega Torres, Secretary-General, Teachers Revolutionary Directorate—in exile:

I would like everyone—from the President to the most humble functionary—in this country to read carefully "The Great Deception," especially the chapter "Darkness Descends" where there is expressed clearly and precisely, as never before, the great harm that communism is inflicting on the minds of Cuban children and youth. Let no one forget that it is these young people—sick with hatred against our democratic principles—who, if we do not act in time, will prevent reintegration of the people into the American community and contaminate it with the poison they have received.

Jose Antonio Gonzalez-Lanuza, Students Revolutionary Directorate of Cuba:

After carefully reading this book on the process of communization that Cuba is suffering today, I wish to express my sincere congratulations for the objectivity and quality of this work.

"The Great Deception" is, to our way of thinking, the best compilation published to date in the United States on the facts about the conversion of Cuba into a satellite of Moscow.

What stands out are the variety of the sources of authoritative information collected by the authors, as well as the clear, impartial exposition of events, told in such a way as to give the North American reader a magnificent panoramic vision of what has occurred in our country during the last 4 years.

In the name of the Students Revolutionary Directorate and myself, I offer sincere congratulations for the work accomplished.

Vicente Rubiera Reito, secretary general, Federation of Cuban Telephone Workers in Exile:

As a Cuban labor leader, Democrat and worker, I would like to take this opportunity to make clear my gratitude for the service rendered the cause of liberty by "The Great Deception"—a true and exclusive account of the process by which the Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. are penetrating the American Continent.

It is the most exact, most realistic expose of how they operate, set in motion and carry Communists to power. It is the best work in behalf of democracy, the liberation of Cuba and the defense of the continent.

Dra. Ana Tomeu de Miller, secretary general of Cuban Feminine Crusade:

"The Great Deception" is a magnificent exposition of how international communism used tactics of deceit and lies to seize Cuba and convert it into an isle of hell, Russian colony and springboard for the expansion of Soviet imperialism in the American Continent.

Cuto
ANTI-COMMUNIST FREEDOM FIGHTERS

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record an editorial entitled "Fighting the Wrong Side," published in the Oakland, Calif., Tribune of April 3, 1963, dealing with the effort of the administration to restrain anti-Communist freedom fighters who are attempting to harass Fidel Castro and establish a strong Cuban underground.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Oakland (Calif.) Tribune, Apr. 3, 1963]

FIGHTING THE WRONG SIDE

The administration has cracked down hard on anti-Communist freedom fighters who are attempting to harass Fidel Castro and establish a strong Cuban underground.

Not content with merely insuring that no raiding parties leave from U.S. territory, the administration has solicited help from Great Britain as well, so that a good portion of the Caribbean Sea is being combed for anti-Communist war parties.

The reason given by the State Department for this "blockade of the blockaders" is that the U.S. Government accrues the blame for the raids in the eyes of the world, and is

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therefore assumed to be committing warlike acts.

Thus, once again, the siren song of manufactured world opinion has been headed by this Nation's pussyfooting diplomats, to the detriment of the free world. For years, the Soviets have built up a global network of sympathizers and "neutralists" who will quack and bleat with alarm every time the United States shows some signs of resisting the advance of global communism.

In recent months, when the anti-Castro resistance has begun to score some real damage against the Cuban regime, world opinion naturally began to chant that the raids were instigated by the U.S. Government.

And now, to its shame, the administration has capitulated to that opinion when it should simply be laughing it off with a declaration that the raids are not sanctioned by the U.S. Government.

The trouble with heeding this kind of world opinion is that it will continue to denounce U.S. "aggression" even if the Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation manage to halt all anti-Castro activity altogether. No matter what the Government does, it can't win against a propaganda machine created by the Soviets. If the United States is going to be berated no matter what it does, then the logical thing is to ignore the clamor and do exactly what will be in the best interest and security of this Nation.

It is a matter of great importance to establish a virile underground in Cuba. The activities of anti-Castro freedom fighters serve not only to drain Castro's strength but to fan the flame of resistance of the captive Cuban people.

The vengeance taken against the anti-Castro Cubans is so severe that one is compelled to wonder whether world opinion is really the reason for it. It looks like the administration is actually as interested in preserving the Castro regime as it is in encouraging its overthrow.

AUTOMATION

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, the problems, challenges, and opportunities of automation in industry continue to expand. At the same time, however, "automation" is still a new word in our national vocabulary, and often a misunderstood word. There can be no misunderstanding, though, about the great changes automation is making in our country and the need to understand and cope with them.

Because of the tremendous impact of automation, and the swiftness with which the changes are taking place, I have called for a White House conference on automation in a bill introduced earlier in this session. Such a conference is necessary, I am convinced, to focus attention on advances in technology and the effects of these advances upon all of us.

Automation also has a bearing on the need for an enlarged and more active program of vocational education, which would come about if another bill I have introduced, S. 1222, is enacted.

An article which helps explain automation appeared in the April 17, 1963, issue of the New York Times magazine. It is by Victor R. Fuchs of the staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He is also a consultant to the Ford Foundation. Because of the timeliness of this article I commend its reading to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FALLACIES AND FACTS ABOUT AUTOMATION

(By Victor R. Fuchs)

Once or twice in a generation a single word captures the attention, imagination and concern of the American people. In the past, the mere mention of such words as "abolition," "prohibition" or "unionization" was enough to strike the sparks of controversy and to epitomize the problems and the promise of complex forces at work in our society.

Today the word is "automation." Originally coined to describe the automatic handling of parts between successive stages of production, automation was later defined as the use of machinery to control machinery. In popular discussion, however, the word has come to mean any kind of technological change, particularly where nonhuman effort is substituted for human labor.

The heat and intensity of the arguments surrounding automation suggest its importance, but amidst the uproar it is often difficult to determine just what the facts and the issues are. For some, automation poses the threat of permanent unemployment, the necessity of undergoing retraining or the possibility of having to uproot home and family to seek employment in a strange community. Others stress the benefits of automation—low costs, new products and the maintenance of world economic leadership for the United States.

The current debate over automation tends to be dominated by the "alarmists"—those who can only see the warehouses filling up with goods and the streets filling up with unemployed—and the "do-nothing" school who find automation an unmixed blessing. This debate is marked by exaggeration, illogical reasoning, and other fallacies. A close look at some of these fallacies may help to provide a basis for constructive attack on the problem, and permit us to enjoy more fully the benefits of technological change.

These are the principal fallacies indulged in by the "alarmist" school:

(1) The rate at which labor is being displaced by technological change is more rapid now than in the past.

This particular fallacy lies at the heart of the "alarmist" position. It is the fundamental premise; the rest is elaboration. Everyone has read or heard about the "increasing rate of technological change." The words come so readily that it seems almost pedantic to question their accuracy. But the fact is that there is no economic evidence to support this premise.

Isolated examples of rapid change abound, but they always have. Recall, for example, the printing press, the cotton gin and the substitution of the typewriter for feathered quills. The question is not whether examples of large-scale displacements of labor can be found in particular firms or industries, but whether the overall impact on the economy is greater now than in the past.

If technological innovations were replacing labor at an increasing rate, one would expect to find evidence of this in the output obtained per man-hour of labor. The figures show no such trend.

For the period 1947-60 output per man-hour in the private sector of the economy grew at an annual rate of 3 percent. This is a slightly higher rate than the average for the entire 20th century but it is not an unprecedented rate for the United States, and it is far below the pace achieved in Japan, Russia and several West European countries.

Moreover, there is no evidence that the rate is increasing. On the contrary, the figures show an average annual gain of 3.5 percent for the period 1947-64, slowing down

to 2.6 percent in the 1954-60 period. Finally, there is little prospect that we are on the threshold of a sharply increased rate in the future; we may have difficulty maintaining the pace of the last 15 years.

One obvious problem is that fewer and fewer of our people are employed in sectors where labor-saving change has been easiest, such as agriculture. Each year more Americans are employed in the service industries, where productivity growth has been slowest. Because of these shifts in employment, we will actually have to achieve an increased rate of productivity growth sector by sector simply in order to maintain the same overall rate of increase. A recent pathbreaking study by Edward F. Denison, "The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States," shows that it will be difficult to achieve this increase.

(2) Automation makes it possible to produce more goods and services than we can possibly use.

This fallacy gets its widest circulation in the well-appointed living room after an excellent dinner that includes an appropriate wine. The hi-fi is usually playing softly in the background, and the conversation is mixed with references to vacations abroad, sports cars, and college admissions. If one were to approach a family of average means with arguments about a surfeit of goods, they would doubt your sanity or your motives. And they would be right.

Most of the talk about our having the ability to produce more goods and services than we need or want, now or in the foreseeable future, is nonsense. It is based either on medieval notions about discriminatory consumption standards for various classes of the population or on a wild overestimation of the productive capacity of the economy.

We need more rapid growth, not less. Consider the demands for helping to raise the living standards of the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world. Consider the problem of removing the deep pockets of poverty that still exist in our rural areas and urban slums. Finally, consider the simple fact that to bring the average American family up to the level of living currently enjoyed in the more prosperous suburbs surrounding New York City would require 25 to 30 years of very rapid growth at full employment.

To argue, as some do, that the problem is primarily one of distribution, is completely in error. If income were divided absolutely equally in the United States, each family would have about \$7,000 per year—an income that falls far short of producing satiety.

Another gross exaggeration is the claim that 30 percent or more of potential output is lost through unemployment. This is based on the observation that certain industries have 30 percent idle capacity, but this is a false guide to production possibilities for the economy as a whole. One might just as well argue that there is no unemployment problem because some industries are working overtime.

Marxian dogma aside, it makes little sense to say that the man who produces an automobile is doing productive work but the man who keeps it in good running order is not, or that the modern farmer is very productive but the research scientists and the farm extension agents who advise him are not.

Not all of the exaggeration and illogic can be found on the alarmist side. A smaller but equally vociferous group sings the praises of automation in arguments that do not stand up well under inspection. This group voices three major "do-nothing" fallacies:

(1) Automation automatically creates at least as many new jobs as it eliminates.

The key word here is "automatically." Of course, it is possible for automation to create new jobs. It does this principally in two ways. First, there are the jobs created to build, install, and service the new machinery. At fixed levels of output, however, this can

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and women who are permanent residents of the United States, who have attained age sixteen but have not attained age twenty-two, and whose participation in such programs will be consistent with the purposes of this title.

(b) Enrollees shall not be subject to the provisions of any other Federal law relating to Federal employment including hours of work, rates of compensation, or employee benefits.

(c) The number of enrollees in programs under this title shall not exceed at any one time the equivalent of 60,000 full-time enrollees during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964, and during the next four fiscal years such numbers as may be maintained within the appropriations made therefor by the Congress.

(d) The Secretary shall provide for testing, counseling, job development, and job referral services through either governmental or private nonprofit agencies to youths in order to carry out the purposes of this title.

Federal share of program costs

SEC. 206. (a) Whenever a State, county, municipal or local youth employment program is determined under section 204 to be appropriate, the Secretary may enter into an agreement with the State, county, or municipal government, or agency or political subdivision thereof, or a private nonprofit agency, under which such government or political subdivision thereof or agency shall pay not more than 50 per centum and not less than 25 per centum of all costs of the program, including those of administration, in such proportion as may be determined by the Secretary, considering among other relevant factors (1) the severity of the rates of unemployment and underemployment in the area and the duration of such unemployment and underemployment, and (2) the income levels of families in such area. The contributions by such government, or political subdivision thereof, or agency, pursuant to such agreements may be in cash or in kind, fairly evaluated, including but not limited to plant, equipment, and services. Such agreements shall further provide that the Secretary will pay grants to such governments or political subdivisions thereof or agencies covering the balance of all costs of such programs, including those of administration.

(b) Funds available for grants under agreements authorized by subsection (a) shall be allocated among the States in the following manner: (A) 50 per centum of such funds in any fiscal year shall be allocated among the States on the basis of the ratio that the total population of each State within the age group referred to in subsection 205(a) bears to the total population of the United States within such age group, and (B) 50 per centum of such funds in any fiscal year shall be allocated by the Secretary in accordance with the ratio that the total unemployment of each State bears to the total unemployment in the United States, using in both cases the previous year's annual average following its publication, and (C) allocations not utilized in (A) shall be reallocated under (B). The population categories and the other relevant factors referred to above shall be determined in accordance with the most recent statistics available from the Bureau of the Census and the Department of Labor.

Authority of secretary

SEC. 207. (a) In carrying out this title, the Secretary is authorized to—

(1) delegate to the heads of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government any of his functions, powers, or duties under this title as he deems appropriate, and to authorize the redelegation thereof by the heads of such departments and agencies.

(2) utilize with their consent the services and facilities of Federal agencies and, with the consent of any State accept and utilize the services and facilities of the agencies of such government or of any county or municipal subdivision thereof; to establish State and local advisory committees; and to utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services as may from time to time be needed.

(3) make such contracts or agreements, establish such procedures, and make such payments, either in advance or by way of reimbursement as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.

(4) encourage the enrollees to participate in a systematic program of training and education provided by State and local educational authorities.

(5) prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.

(b) Any agreement under this title shall contain such provisions as may be necessary to promote effective administration, protect the United States against loss, and insure the application of funds in a manner consistent with the provisions and purposes of this title and the terms of such agreement.

National Advisory Council on State and Community Youth Employment Programs

SEC. 208. (a) There is hereby established in the Department of Labor a National Advisory Council on State and Community Youth Employment Programs (hereinafter referred to as the "Council"). The Council shall be composed of the Secretary or his designee, who shall be Chairman, and nine members appointed by the Secretary without regard to the civil service laws. The appointed members of the Council shall be persons (including persons from public and voluntary organizations) who are recognized authorities in professional or technical fields related to the employment of youth or who represent the fields of conservation, agriculture, education, training, labor, management, and urban development, or persons representative of the general public who are leaders in programs concerned with employment of youth. The Council shall advise the Secretary on the administration of this title. The Council shall also include, whenever appropriate, the various agency heads designated in section 209 of this title.

(b) Upon request of the Secretary, the Council shall review the operation of this title in general and shall from time to time make recommendations to the Secretary relative to the execution of his responsibilities under this title. The Council may also make recommendations to the Secretary on projects referred to it by the Secretary. The Council shall meet at least twice each year and at such other times as the Secretary may request. The Secretary is authorized to utilize the services of any member or members of the Council in connection with matters relating to this title for such periods, in addition to conference periods, as he may determine.

(c) Appointed members of the Council, while attending meetings of the Council or otherwise serving at the request of the Secretary, shall be entitled to receive compensation at a rate to be fixed by the Secretary, but not exceeding \$75 per diem, including travel time, and while away from their homes or regular places of business, they may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 73b-2) for persons in the Government service employed intermittently. Notwithstanding the foregoing or any other provision of law, the Secretary may accept the services of appointed members under this section without the payment of compensation therefor (and with or without payment of travel expenses or per diem in lieu of subsistence).

Interagency consultation

SEC. 209. In the administration of this title, the Secretary shall seek the advice and assistance of the Secretaries of the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare, Agriculture, and Interior, of the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, and of such other agency heads as the Secretary deems appropriate.

Appropriations authorized

SEC. 210. (a) For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title, there is authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1963, the sum of \$60 million and for each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years thereafter such amounts as the Congress may determine to be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.

(b) Funds authorized to be appropriated under this title may be transferred between departments and agencies of the Government for use for the purpose for which they are specifically authorized and appropriated and may also be granted to State and local governments for the purpose provided in this title.

Report by the Secretary

SEC. 211. Not later than 120 days after the close of each fiscal year, the Secretary shall prepare and submit to the President for transmittal to the Congress a full and complete report on the activities and programs authorized by this title during such year; and not later than January 1, 1966, the Secretary shall prepare and submit to the President for transmittal to the Congress a full and complete report evaluating the activities and programs authorized by this title from its inception together with such recommendations as he may deem desirable.

Cuba
THE ENEMY'S NAME IS KHRUSHCHEV, NOT KENNEDY

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, the pamphlet, "Has Cuba Been Abandoned to Communism?" written by W. Cleon Skousen, represents a serious attempt to undermine the confidence of the American people in their Government. Honest, forthright dissent is an essential element in the democratic process of government, but this does not mean that we must silently accept deliberately distorted allegations against our U.S. Government. Any opinion or idea offered in the political marketplace must stand the test of challenge and inquiry; it is in this fashion that general interest and public understanding of political issues is fostered. In a democracy, the people are the ones who are responsible for their Government—and the people must be honestly and continually informed. Only in such a way can each citizen perform his role in making our form of government work. An alert, informed citizenry is the one essential element upon which a democracy such as ours depends. That is why such a pamphlet as this one disturbs me so much—because it is a deliberate attempt to misinform the people. Moreover, it is a cleverly calculated, shrewdly executed, and piously self-righteous attempt to misinform the people.

We must not confuse such calculated, deceptive literature with honest and legitimate differences of opinions about our problems with Cuba. There is great need for such open, public debate about the Cuban situation today, because the

the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(q) SERVICE AS ENROLLEE IN YOUTH CONSERVATION CORPS.—For purposes of this chapter, the term 'employment' shall, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, include service performed by an individual as an enrollee in the Youth Conservation Corps established by title I of the Youth Employment Act, and all such service shall be deemed to have been performed by such individual as an employee of the United States."

(2) Subsection (1) of such section is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(4) SERVICE IN THE YOUTH CONSERVATION CORPS.—For purposes of this chapter, in the case of an individual performing service to which the provisions of subsection (q) apply, his 'wages' shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (a) (1) of this section, be deemed to be \$150 for each calendar month during all of which he is an enrollee within the meaning of title I of the Youth Employment Act, or \$5 per day for any calendar month during part (but not all) of which he is such an enrollee."

(3) The first sentence of section 3122 of such Code (relating to Federal service) is amended by striking out "and including service," and inserting in lieu thereof "service," and by inserting "and service, performed as an enrollee within the meaning of title I of the Youth Employment Act, to which the provisions of section 3121(q) are applicable," after "section 3121(p) are applicable."

(4) Section 6051(a) of such Code is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "In the case of compensation for service as an enrollee in the Youth Conservation Corps, the statement shall show, in lieu of the amount required to be shown by paragraph (5), the total amount of wages as defined in section 3121(a), computed in accordance with such section and section 3121(1)(4)."

(5) Section 3401(a) of such Code (relating to the definition of wages for purposes of the collection of income tax at source on wages) is amended by striking out ", or " at the end of paragraph (6) and inserting in lieu thereof "; or", by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (12) and inserting in lieu thereof "; or", and by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (13) and inserting in lieu thereof "; or", and by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(14) pursuant to section 108(b) of title I of the Youth Employment Act, other than any portion determined thereunder to be additional base compensation, for service performed as an enrollee within the meaning of such title."

(6) Section 121(a) of such Code is amended by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (18) and inserting in lieu thereof "", and by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(19) Amounts received by enrollees under section 108 of title I of the Youth Employment Act, see such section 108(c)."

(d) The amendments made by subsection (b) of this section and by paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (c) of this section shall apply with respect to service performed after the date of the enactment of this Act. The amendment made by paragraph (5) of subsection (c) of this section shall apply with respect to remuneration paid after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(e) (1) Enrollees under this title shall, for the purpose of the administration of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (39 Stat. 742, as amended), be deemed to be civil employees of the United States within the meaning of the term "employee" as defined in section 40 of such Act and the pro-

visions thereof shall apply except as herein-after provided.

(2) For purposes of this section—

(A) The term "performance of duty" in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act shall not include any act of an enrollee—

(i) while he is on authorized leave or pass; or

(ii) while he is absent from his assigned post of duty, except while participating in an activity authorized by or under the direction or supervision of the Corps.

(B) In computing compensation benefits for disability or death under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, the monthly pay of an enrollee shall be deemed to be \$150 a month, except that with respect to compensation for disability accruing after the individual concerned reaches the age of 21, such monthly pay shall be deemed to be that received under the entrance salary for GS-2 under the Classification Act of 1949, as amended.

(C) The term "injury" as defined in section 40 of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act shall include disease, illness, or injury if it arises out of service in the Corps.

(D) Compensation for disability, including medical care, shall not begin to accrue until the day following the date on which the injured enrollee is discharged from the Corps.

Appropriations authorized

Sec. 110. (a) For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title, there is authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1963, the sum of \$30,000,000, and for each of the four succeeding fiscal years thereafter such amounts as the Congress may determine to be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.

(b) Funds authorized to be appropriated under this title may be transferred between departments and agencies of the Government for use for the purpose for which they are specifically authorized and appropriated and may also be transferred to State governments for the purposes provided in this title.

Reports

Sec. 111. Not later than one hundred and twenty days after the close of each fiscal year, the Secretary shall prepare and submit to the President for transmittal to the Congress a full and complete report on the activities of the Corps during such year, and not later than January 1, 1966, the Secretary shall prepare and submit to the President for transmittal to the Congress a full and complete report evaluating the activities of the Corps from its inception, together with such recommendations as he may deem desirable.

TITLE II—STATE AND COMMUNITY YOUTH EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM

Short title

Sec. 201. This title may be cited as the "State and Community Youth Employment Act".

Statement of purpose

Sec. 202. The purpose of this title is to provide useful work experience opportunities for unemployed youths so that their employability may be increased through participation in State and community youth employment programs thereby enabling the agencies of the State, county, or municipality or political subdivision thereof to carry out programs in the field of conservation and development of natural resources and recreational areas, or various other programs which will permit or contribute to an undertaking or service in the public interest which will otherwise not be provided.

Development of State and community employment programs

Sec. 203. In order to carry out the purposes of this title, the Secretary of Labor (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary")

shall assist and cooperate with the agencies of State (which for the purposes of this title shall include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa), county, and local governments and private nonprofit agencies in developing programs for the employment of young people in State and community service activities, hereinafter authorized, including the conservation, development, and management of the natural resources of the State and the community and the development, management, and protection of recreational areas within the State and the community, which, whenever appropriate, shall be coordinated with a program of training and education provided by local educational authorities. In those States where the public land holdings of the Federal Government are less than 5 per centum of the land area within the State, the Secretary when requested, may offer such additional assistance as may be required in the development of programs of conservation and recreation. The Secretary shall advise such State and local governments as to the number and availability of unemployed young people, their skills and qualifications for various types of work, and shall provide in cooperation with local school authorities for the orderly selection and referral of youths for enrollment in such programs.

Approval of programs

Sec. 204. (a) The Secretary is authorized to approve for assistance under this title any State, county, municipal, or local programs submitted hereunder if he determines, in accordance with such regulations as he may prescribe, that—

(1) enrollees in the program will be employed either (A) on publicly owned and operated facilities or projects, or (B) on local projects, sponsored by private nonprofit agencies approved by the appropriate State agency;

(2) the program will increase the employability of the enrollees, or will enable student enrollees to resume or to maintain school attendance;

(3) the program will permit or contribute to an undertaking or service in the public interest which will not otherwise be provided, or will contribute to the conservation, development, and management of the natural resources of the State or community or to the development, management, or protection of State or community recreation areas;

(4) the program will not result in the displacement of employed workers;

(5) the rates of pay and other conditions of employment are appropriate and reasonably consistent with the rates and conditions applicable with respect to comparable work in the locality;

(6) to the maximum extent feasible, the program will be coordinated with vocational training and educational services adapted to the special needs of enrollees in such program and sponsored by State, county, or local school authorities: *Provided*, That where such services are inadequate or unavailable, the program may make provision for the enlargement, improvement, development, and coordination of such services with the cooperation of, or where appropriate pursuant to agreement with, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; and

(7) the program includes standards and procedures for the selection of applicants including provisions assuring full coordination and cooperation with local and other authorities to encourage students to maintain or resume school attendance.

(b) In approving projects under this title, the Secretary shall give priority to projects with high training potential.

Enrollees in programs

Sec. 205. (a) Enrollment in programs under this title shall be limited to young men

American people need to reach a consensus on what the U.S. policy toward Cuba should be. First, there should be a factual understanding about what the situation with regard to Cuba is; next, we should examine the possible avenues of action open to us, considering the consequences of each; and finally, decide on what we want done, and give the Government our full and undivided support in carrying out our wishes. This is how a democracy works.

Such a booklet as Skousen's clouds and muddies the entire picture of Cuba, and thereby does a great disservice to the American people. This booklet is riddled with vagueness, half-truths, isolated events taken out of context and strung together artificially, and in some instances with outright deception. What the motivation behind such a deliberately calculated attempt to misinform the American people was, I cannot presume to say. But I emphatically resent the objective of this pamphlet, and therefore feel compelled to point out a few things about it in a frank, open, and I honestly hope successful, effort to completely discredit it. I am not going to honor this booklet with an attempt to refute it word for word, sentence for sentence, page for page. It does not merit such attention. If it were an honest opinion of dissent, I would be the first to acknowledge that it did deserve such a reply, but it is not.

This booklet, as I stated in an address on the floor of the Senate of the United States, is based almost entirely on the completely false charges that our President has betrayed the United States by making the following commitments to Khrushchev:

1. A personal guarantee by the President that the United States would not attempt to liberate Cuba.

2. A personal guarantee by the President that the United States would not allow any other Western Hemisphere country to liberate Cuba.

What is the source given by Skousen to substantiate these charges? A letter from the Premier of Soviet Russia, Mr. Khrushchev, which Skousen states was printed in the New York Times on October 29, 1962. The booklet states that the Khrushchev letter was in answer to the "secret letter" from our President to Mr. Khrushchev several days earlier, in which the President made these commitments. But as I pointed out previously to my colleagues in the Senate, the letter from our President was not secret, because it was published right alongside the letter quoted by Skousen, on the same day and on the same page, in the New York Times. And if Mr. Skousen had not been attempting to deceive the American people, and had quoted from our President's letter, instead of from the Premier of Soviet Russia's letter, the people could plainly read that the President set the conditions of onsite inspection inside of Cuba as our condition of promising—not to refrain from attempting to liberate Cuba, as charged by Skousen—but to refrain from invading Cuba.

Furthermore, as the President's letter states, he did not guarantee the United

States would not allow any other nation in the Western Hemisphere to liberate Cuba, as falsely charged by Skousen; he said that if Russia allowed on-site inspection and we pledged noninvasion of Cuba—"I am confident that the other nations of the hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise." Perhaps they would have, and perhaps not, but that is beside the point. The point here is that a false charge was made against the President of the United States by a man who quoted the No. 1 Communist in the world to back up this false charge. And this in spite of the fact that the letter he quoted as proof from the New York Times was printed right along side of the President's letter, which Khrushchev distorted and which Skousen falsely called secret. I ask Senators sincerely, Is this honest? Does this represent legitimate dissent in the interest of informing the American public about the truth? Obviously it does not.

In any case, I am sure that any newspaper reader knows that the Russians did not permit inspection of their dismantled missile sites inside of Cuba, and therefore did not meet the necessary pre-conditions for our tentative promise to refrain from invading Cuba. The Secretary of State and the President of the United States have both stated unequivocally that we are therefore not bound in any fashion by any agreement with the Soviet Union, because they did not fulfill their half of the contemplated agreement. I am disturbed about the motivations of Skousen and his backers in deliberately and deceptively trying to paint the President as a traitor to his

country.

On page 3 of this misleading tract of his, Mr. Skousen, using a typical propaganda device, lifts a quote out of context and surrounds it with his own commentary in order to pervert its original meaning. The quote is from an article written in 1947 by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and the lifted quote is an attempt by Skousen to portray one of the President's advisers as a sinister pro-Communist, in an infernal attempt, I suppose, to further undermine the confidence of the American people in their elected President. The fact is that the Schlesinger article was advocating the containment of Soviet Russia expansionism—remember, this was in 1947, when only a few people recognized the dangers of a renewed appetite for territory on the part of our wartime ally against Hitler. That does not sound like a pro-Communist position to me. But, of course, I am not picking a sentence out of context.

In much the same familiar, deceptive manner, this pamphlet goes on and on, speaking of our policy of softness toward communism, when we are spending \$50 billion a year to build and maintain a Defense Department capable of making a cloud of dust out of what is now the Soviet Union if harm is threatened to the United States. Skousen makes a little list of 15 items which he says illustrate the American policy of softness toward communism. Some of them are so vague and ridiculous that they cannot even be sensibly answered, but I am

going to take a few of these points, and show that in each case the charges made by this booklet are misleading, deceptive, or based on a complete misrepresentation of the real facts of the matter.

One such charge is that the Kennedy administration "ordered the lifting of the ban on the distribution of Communist propaganda through the U.S. mails, allowing it to be distributed to American citizens postage free." How deceptive a little statement like this can be. Let me take 1 minute to give the facts in this matter, and then Senators may judge for themselves how misleading this statement of Skousen's is. First of all, no material, propaganda or not, is delivered postage free. If it does not bear postage, mail is not delivered. But let us examine the more serious charge.

Prior to 1958, an interception program relating to Communist propaganda material was in effect. Under this program, printed matter arriving from Communist countries, and thought to be Communist propaganda, was delivered to addressees if they had specifically indicated they desired it, or if it was addressed to a registered foreign agent, a foreign embassy, a U.S. Government agency, a newspaper, a library, or an educational institution. In 1958 this policy was amended so that individual addressees who did not come within one of these exceptions were asked whether they wanted the propaganda publications addressed to them. If they replied that they did, the material was delivered.

In 1960 approximately 5½ percent of printed material from Communist bloc countries was excluded as being propaganda not desired by the addressees.

During 1960 a committee of the National Security Council had recommended the discontinuance of the interception system. The recommendation was accepted by the Planning Board of the National Security Council, but was not carried forward until March 1961, when it was concluded that the interception program had no intelligence value. Six legal actions had been filed against the Government questioning the constitutional and legislative authority to detain this mail. The Department of Justice was convinced that legislative authority was lacking to detain such postage-paid mail.

The discontinuance of the interception program in no way affected the method of handling publications addressed to libraries, universities, and the like, which have been receiving them all along; and it did not permit the mails to be used to carry literature which could not use the mails before.

So, it was the U.S. National Security Council, under President Eisenhower, that made the decision not to further detain mails for evaluation and acceptance by the addressee. But it is true that it was under President Kennedy, who had been President for about 50 days, that the change in regulations came into effect on March 17, 1961.

But all this quibbling about who was President when the decision was made or came into effect is nonsense, and Skousen knows it. The reason? Before his pamphlet was published, there was

a new law on the statute books, chapter 51 of title 39, United States Code, as amended, which states in section 4008:

Communist political propaganda, shall be detained by the Postmaster General upon its arrival for delivery in the United States, or upon its subsequent deposit in the United States domestic mails, and the addressee shall be notified that such matter has been received and will be delivered only upon the addressee's request.

That is the present law of the land, approved, signed, and enforced by the President of the United States. But would we know this from reading the Skousen charge? Of course not, because it was designed to deceive us. But Senators can see the trouble and care one must go to in order to clarify and disprove such statements.

I am only going to take time to dispose of a few more of these charges, such as this one that the Kennedy administration began laying the foundation for the seating of Red China in the United Nations and then backed away under an avalanche of public protest. The truth is that it was the Soviet Union who laid the foundation of the admission of Red China to the U.N., and it was done in early 1950, when young John F. Kennedy was merely a third-term Representative from the State of Massachusetts. And incidentally, our representative to the United Nations under President Kennedy, as under President Eisenhower, and under President Truman, has consistently opposed the admission of Red China to the U.N.

The final charge which I am going to take the trouble of exposing as false and misleading is that the current administration pushed through the abolishing of the loyalty oath for students seeking Federal loans. Again, the facts of the matter are contrary to the charge. It was a large group of colleges and universities which pushed through the amendment to the National Defense Education Act, eliminating the so-called disclaimer affidavit. Institutions of higher education which refused to participate in, or withdrew from, the NDEA program because of the disclaimer affidavit requirement included Princeton, Radcliffe, St. John's, Vassar, Wesleyan, Yale, Harvard, and many others, all of them among our leading universities.

There was, of course, a reason for these institutions to oppose the disclaimer affidavit. It was that there were two affidavits, one a positive oath or affirmation of faith and allegiance to our Government, which the schools mentioned did not oppose, and the other a negative disclaimer to the effect that the student was not a member of and would not support any organization dedicated to the overthrow of our Government. It was this challenge to young people's loyalty specifically that these schools opposed, and it was this negative disclaimer which was eliminated on the demands of these schools and a total of some 200 more major universities, including Indiana University, the Universities of Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, and many more. How does that square with the vague and misleading charge that the Kennedy administration pushed through the abolishing of the loyalty

oath? Once more, obviously it does not stand up.

I have taken this trouble to clarify the charges brought up by Mr. Skousen not to honor them as worthy of answering, but to discredit them. Such charges, whether they be made against President Eisenhower or President Kennedy, are designed to undermine the faith of the American people in their duly elected public officials. What the motivations for this are I do not know, but the results I deplore. I would like to close with a quote from the Director of the FBI, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, who wrote in his book, "Masters of Deceit," which described the dangers of the Communist menace to the United States, that—

As we have seen, identifying Communists is not easy. They are trained in deceit and trickery and use every form of camouflage and dishonesty to advance their cause.

For this reason we must be absolutely certain that our fight is waged with full regard for the historic liberties of this great Nation. This is the fundamental premise of any attack against communism.

Too often I have seen cases where loyal and patriotic but misguided Americans have thought they were "fighting communism" by slapping the label of "Red" or "Communist" on anybody who happened to be different from them or to have ideas with which they did not agree.

Smears, character assassination, and the scattering of irresponsible charges have no place in this Nation. They create division, suspicion, and distrust among loyal Americans—just what the Communists want—and hinder rather than aid the fight against communism.

Mr. President, a few weeks ago when I first mentioned the pamphlet written by Mr. Skousen and made my remarks on the floor, I received a letter from a citizen of Salt Lake City who asked that I place the pamphlet in the RECORD. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the pamphlet entitled "Has Cuba Been Abandoned to Communism?" written by W. Cleon Skousen, may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the pamphlet was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HAS CUBA BEEN ABANDONED TO COMMUNISM?

(By W. Cleon Skousen)

In all the excitement over the October 1962 crisis in Cuba, many Americans apparently missed the fact that the President of the United States paid an appalling price for the Russian promise to dismantle the Cuban missile bases.

Nearly all the newspapers carried headlines such as "Khrushchev Backs Down," or "J.F.K. Gets Russian Accord." Down in the small print—which too few people read—was the shocking disclosure that President Kennedy had made two commitments to Khrushchev which Cuban freedom fighters could scarcely believe:

1. A personal guarantee by the President that the United States would not attempt to liberate Cuba.

2. A personal guarantee by the President that the United States would not allow any other Western Hemisphere country to liberate Cuba.

KHRUSHCHEV'S VICTORY

The New York Times for October 29, 1962, carried the full text of Khrushchev's reply to the Kennedy commitments. He shrewdly spelled out the embarrassing details of the amazing and completely unnecessary capitulation which President Kennedy had

made in his secret letter to Khrushchev 2 days earlier. Said Khrushchev:

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message on October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you have said in the same message of yours" (the New York Times, western edition, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 4).

Those who caught the full impact of this tremendous legal and diplomatic victory for Khrushchev wondered how the President and his advisers could have been so completely outmaneuvered. Only a few days before, President Kennedy had made himself a world hero by standing up to Khrushchev and commanding the military might of the U.S. armed services to throw a blockade around Cuba. Khrushchev had immediately tried to conciliate the President by promising that the Soviet Union would not indulge in any rash act. It was obvious that Khrushchev was afraid of the brink. (For a brief background on Castro's original conquest of Cuba see "The Naked Communist," ch. 11.)

Military authorities had already advised the White House that the Soviet leaders would not dare make a war issue out of Cuba because of America's vast superiority in fire power. Latin American countries had assured the United States of their complete support in this new posture of U.S. firmness. Thousands of Cuban freedom fighters had been encouraged to join Spanish-speaking units of the U.S. Army with the confidence that the liberation of Communist-conquered Cuba was only days away. Members of Congress openly assured the President that this was the hour to invoke the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Pact to show the Soviet Union that foreign conquests of independent nations in North and South America would not be tolerated.

With such manifest forces of unity and strength behind the United States, why did the administration allow Khrushchev to extort from it a promise that there would be no attempt to liberate Cuba if the Soviets would just dismantle their illegal missile bases? And by what authority did the President commit the military might and prestige of the United States to a policy of preventing any other country in the Western Hemisphere from liberating Cuba?

There was also the very serious possibility that the President had entered into a secret pact which amounted to a treaty agreement without providing any opportunity to have the Senate approve it as required by the Constitution. The treaty approving power of the Senate was intended by the founding fathers to bring the facts out in the open where the people could have a chance to examine the issues before any sweeping commitments were made. In this spirit Woodrow Wilson had strongly advocated open covenants, openly arrived at. The merits of such a policy were demonstrated in the Kennedy-Khrushchev negotiations. If Khrushchev had not published these commitments, the American people might never have heard of them. Undoubtedly Khrushchev knew he was embarrassing the American President by publishing what was to have remained a secret agreement between two heads of state.

Citizens wondered what was in the President's mind when he deliberately tied the hand of the American forces and committed the United States to a permanent policy of neutrality toward Soviet-conquered Cuba.

IS PRESIDENT KENNEDY FOLLOWING THE SCHLESINGER-ACHESON LINE?

Among the closest advisors to President Kennedy is Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who has openly opposed any anti-Soviet policy. He also says the United States can come to socialism "through a series of New Deals." He has referred to the freedom fighters be-

hind the Iron Curtain as "reactionaries" and called their lost liberties "obsolete prerogatives." As far back as 1947 Dr. Schlesinger boasted that the State Department was following the policies which he advocated:

"Though the secret has been kept pretty much from the readers of the liberal press, the State Department has been proceeding for some time somewhat along these lines. Both Byrnes and Marshall have perceived the essential need—to be firm without being rancorous, to check Soviet expansion without making unlimited commitments to an anti-Soviet crusade, to invoke power to counter power without engaging in senseless intimidation, to encourage the growth of the democratic left. The performance has often fallen below the conception; but the direction has been correct. Men like Ben Cohen, Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, have tried to work out details and whip up support for this admittedly risky program" (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Sept. 26, 1961, p. 20125).

It was risky indeed. By the end of 1948 all of Eastern Europe had been pulled behind the Iron Curtain with a loss of over 100 million allies. By the end of 1949, we had lost China with its teeming population of between 450 and 600 million. Congressional testimony revealed that the same tragic policy continued throughout the Korean war. Even when there was a change of administration in 1952, the men who were masterminding the foreign policy behind the scenes continued to follow the stubborn, almost blind, conviction that the Communists would change.

As Dr. Schlesinger pointed out in his book, "The Vital Center" (1949), the object is to have communism mellow and the free democracies come together with it under peaceful socialism. That is what he means by stating that we should contain the Soviets but push the rest of the world toward the "democratic left." He believes the Communist leaders should not be looked upon as enemies but as over-zealous allies whose brutalities must be tempered so that they behave more like true socialists. And because the Communists are allies in this sense, Dr. Schlesinger is not in favor of liberating any of the Communist-conquered countries. He makes this very clear in his statement:

"At the same time, the United States must not succumb to demands for an anti-Soviet crusade nor permit reactionaries in the buffer States to precipitate conflicts in defense of their own obsolete prerogatives."

Notice that the freedom fighters behind the iron curtain are referred to as reactionaries and their longing for liberty as obsolete prerogatives.

These views are prevalent among a certain body of powerful policymakers who serve in the State Department and the White House. Their influence seeps to the surface on numerous occasions where it may be easily observed.

THE POLICY OF SOFTNESS TOWARD COMMUNISM

In the Cuban crisis of October 1962 the President was apparently guided by these policymakers who followed the Schlesinger line as outlined above. It was characterized by a determination to remove the threat of Russian military conquest but smother the rising tide of popular demand for the liberation of Cuba from communism. It was the same kind of thinking during the previous administration which guided the State Department in supporting Castro in spite of reliable warnings that he was a Soviet agent. Men of this persuasion do not seem to fear the cunning of Communists the way most ordinary people do. They somehow feel that the Communists can be controlled, they can be manipulated, they can be forced to mellow. They therefore approach them in a spirit of accomoda-

tion and appeasement which often violates the most elementary aspects of protecting American interests. This evident in the following incidents which have occurred during the past 18 months. These incidents shocked many Americans at the time they occurred, but only one rare occasions were enough citizens paying attention to do anything about it. Every one of these incidents created circumstances favorable to the Communist position and detrimental to that of the United States.

1. Official State Department proposal to disarm the United States and transfer its military, naval and air force equipment (including nuclear weapons) to the United Nations.

2. Refusal by the President to proclaim the 3d week in July as the traditional CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK because it was an unnecessary irritant in relations with the Soviets. Public pressure finally prevailed but the proclamation was extremely weak, making no reference to communism and the slave states under it.

3. Ordered the dismissal of charges against indicted Russian spy, Igor Y. Melekh, to improve Soviet-American relations.

4. Ordered the release from prison of Communist Party organizational secretary, Harry Winston, one of 11 Communist leaders convicted of conspiring to overthrow the U.S. Government by force and violence. Winston immediately went to Russia with State Department permission where he appeared on radio and television castigating the United States.

5. Forced the anti-Communist government of Laos to accept Communists in positions of leadership. Threatened to withdraw all American aid if the Laotian Government failed to comply.

6. Ordered the lifting of the ban on the distribution of Communist propaganda through the U.S. mails, allowing it to be distributed to American citizens postage free.

7. Forced Dutch New Guinea to become a part of pro-Communist Indonesia in spite of a previous promise to help these people become an independent country.

8. Openly promoted a Communist coalition government in the Congo. Gave financial support to the conquest of Katanga which had broken away from the Congo in protest against the Communist domination of the government.

9. Sent more than 70 jet planes to the Communist government of Yugoslavia.

10. Used political pressure to force the Senate to give up its resistance to foreign aid to Yugoslavia and Poland.

11. Ordered military officials to submit speeches to the State Department for censorship. References to the threat of the Soviet Union and the need for victory in the cold war were deleted.

12. Began laying the foundation for the seating of Red China in the United Nations and then backed away under an avalanche of public protest.

13. Pushed through the abolishing of the loyalty oath for students seeking Federal loans.

14. Sided with Russia in condemning our long-time ally, Portugal, for suppressing the Communist-inspired uprising in Angola. Allies in Europe condemned United States for being on the wrong side.

15. Initiated negotiations with Russia to discuss concession of rights in Berlin when these rights had been previously fixed in at least five iron-clad agreements.

SOFT POLICY SHOWS UP AT BAY OF PIGS INVASION

In an article entitled, "Kennedy's Fateful Decision," the U.S. News and World Report for September 17, 1962, summarized the facts surrounding the tragic Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The Readers Digest re-

printed the same article in its November 1962 issue.

The facts are not pleasant. President Kennedy had approved the invasion which took place April 17, 1961, and he had promised the invaders air cover. Two U.S. carriers, their decks loaded with fighting planes, were standing by within easy striking distance. In addition, the invaders had their own planes which they expected to use for their protection. Here is the way the article describes what happened:

"Secure in this assurance of air support, the invaders went ashore in the early morning darkness of Monday, April 17. Their landing was successful; 1,400 armed men reached the beaches of a place called the Bay of Pigs.

"In the battle that followed, Castro's troops suffered heavy casualties. Castro's tanks, coming up to the battle, were sitting ducks for an attack by air. Confidently, the little invading force waited for its air support to arrive. Its leaders had assurance of that support. It was provided in the preinvasion planning.

"Hours before, on Sunday evening, a small but potent force of B-26's was sitting in readiness on an airfield 500 miles away, waiting to take off for the Bay of Pigs. Those were planes of the invasion force, with Cuban pilots.

"But those planes didn't take off.

"The reason: President Kennedy forbade their use.

"That was the fateful decision President Kennedy made on that Sunday evening. He decided that the anti-Castro Cubans could not have the support of their own air force during the invasion. Without that support, the invasion failed."

President Kennedy made his decision the night before the invasion and while the invasion force was still on the high seas. Nevertheless, the Cubans were allowed to continue their course and make their landing without ever being told that their air cover had been canceled. The military aspects of the decision was one factor, the moral question of promising these fighting men protection and then removing it without letting them know, was quite another. It did something to the image of American leadership in Latin American minds which may never be forgiven.

Then there is the military aspect of the decision.

Even after the landing when officials in charge of the invasion pleaded with the President to change his mind, he refused. Even when they told him the mission was collapsing he remained adamant. In this hour President Kennedy was the Commander in Chief. No one could overrule him. Whatever his motives, they must have been powerful indeed to resist both the advice of CIA officials and the obvious embarrassment which the collapse of the invasion was bound to bring.

The U.S. News & World Report emphasizes how easy it would have been to liberate Cuba had the President's promised help been provided:

"The invaders inflicted close to 2,000 casualties on Castro's forces, suffered only a hundred or so casualties of their own. But without air support, the invaders could not hold out. Most of them wound up as Castro captives.

"American military officials who followed this operation say that it came within a hair's breadth of success. They say: Given early air support, the invaders could have destroyed Castro's air force and tanks. Defections from his militia, which had started, would have spread. Underground forces, waiting for word of success before rising against Castro, would have sprung into action. When that word did not come, they remained underground."

SOFT POLICY SHOWS UP IN EVENT CULMINATING
IN THE OCTOBER CRISIS

By midsummer 1962 it was impossible to completely suppress the reports from Cuba that the Soviets had landed substantial military forces and were building Cuban bases for the launching of nuclear missiles. Senator KENNETH B. KEATING, of New York, carried these reports to the floor of the Senate in August 1962. He repeated them during the month of September. On October 10 he declared: "Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites for intermediate-range tactical missiles. My own sources on the Cuban situation *** have substantiated this report completely."

The administration seemed casual if not indifferent to these warnings. It is now known that by October 16 aerial photos had verified the existence of both offensive missiles and Soviet jet bombers in Cuba but the official line continued to discount charges that a crisis was brewing in Cuba. As late as October 20, newsmen peppered the Defense Department with questions about the reports of Soviet missiles and jet bombers in Cuba and were met with flat denials.

The U.S. News & World Report later published an article entitled: "How U.S. Newsmen Were Misled About Cuba." The article stated:

"American news reporters and editors are complaining that they were deceived by the Kennedy administration about the situation in Cuba" (issue of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 8).

The President, meanwhile, was on a campaign tour, and had run headlong into a political chill at the grassroots level wherever the subject of Cuba came up. On the eve of an election the crisis in Cuba had become an issue with the people. Suddenly, the President terminated his tour, claiming he had contracted a cold, and hurried back to Washington.

Two days later President Kennedy went on the air and proclaimed a blockade of Cuba. A shout of triumph went up all over the free world. It looked as though the sleeping giant were waking up at last. But certain aspects of the President's blockade speech were puzzling: the Monroe Doctrine was never mentioned, there was no promise of any help to liberate the Cuban people, the overthrow of Castro's Communist regime was definitely not on the agenda.

It was on October 27 that President Kennedy sent his secret communication to Khrushchev promising that no attempt would be made to invade Cuba and that no other country in the Western Hemisphere would be allowed to liberate Cuba if the Soviet Union would remove its missiles. It was on October 29 that the New York Times published the full text of Khrushchev's reply and told the world what President Kennedy had agreed to do.

It appeared that legally and diplomatically, Cuba had been abandoned to communism.

The administration team had conducted itself completely within the framework of the Schlesinger-Acheson doctrine of keeping the Soviet within bounds but not attempting to liberate any Communist-conquered territory.

Only one question then remained for Cuba: Would the American people stand for it? Americans everywhere seemed to feel that the sooner Cuba was liberated the less blood it would cost. The longer it was postponed the stronger the forces would become which inevitably must be rooted out. They knew it was not just for Cuba that a new policy of firmness was required—the whole future of the world depended on it.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the nuclear test ban treaty proposed by the

President of the United States is in the national interest.

This afternoon, I wish to discuss this question on the basis of scientific fact and rational argument, rather than on the basis of partisan politics. I regret very much that a good deal of the discussion of the nuclear test ban treaty proposed by the United States has been, to date, on a partisan basis. I deplore this very much.

I wish to make the following points:

First, a nuclear test ban treaty is in the best interests of the United States and is in the best interests of world peace. It would reduce international tension. It would decelerate the spread of the arms race. It would inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not now have them. It would prevent additional fallout, which, all over the world, is causing great damage to the health of future generations; and if testing is resumed, this damage will accelerate almost in geometrical progression.

Second, American security is impaired, not enhanced, by the unlimited development of nuclear weapons capability. At the present time, both the United States and Soviet Russia have a substantial overkill capacity. If an attack were to be made by one on the other, regardless of which one began it, it would be impossible for either side to escape incredibly destructive retaliation.

Third, presently we are far ahead of the Soviets in the development of nuclear weapons. Reputable scientific opinion believes that we have from three to eight times as many intercontinental ballistic missiles as the Soviet Union. Therefore, continued development through testing would not be in our interest; but it would be in the interest of Soviet Russia. It would be against our interest, because since we have this overkill capacity, inevitably the result of continued testing would be to narrow that gap. I make the categorical statement that the policies of President Eisenhower and of President Kennedy have not cost us our nuclear superiority. We still have it by a substantial margin. But in the event of nuclear war, the Soviet Union has enough to be able to wreak frightful damage on our country.

Fourth, the argument that our representatives are pursuing a "soft" political line in the negotiations at Geneva and elsewhere is completely fallacious. It is true that we have decreased the number of onsite inspections which we would require as part of any treaty which we would sign, but this is because of the development of the art of seismic detection. We do not need nearly as many inspections as we did before in order to ascertain whether a suspicious seismic event is an earthquake or is a nuclear explosion. The fallacious argument that we do need as many as we formerly did was exposed in great detail, and most convincingly, by the able Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] in a brilliant speech which he made on the floor of the Senate about 3 weeks to a month ago. I deeply regret that his speech was not adequately reported in any of the communications media. It is not true that massive underground tests

can be conducted in the Soviet Union without detection. There is not enough soft alluvial soil in the Soviet Union to provide the sites for such massive tests; and if such tests were conducted underground anywhere except in alluvial soil, they would be rapidly detected by the detection stations now in existence, and they would be confirmed by the seismic stations which, under our treaty draft, we would be entitled to erect on Russian soil.

Fifth, those opposed to a treaty grossly exaggerate the risks of cheating, and minimize the risks of continuing the arms race. For example, Dr. Edward Teller has made the completely fallacious, unsound, and untrue statement that the test-ban treaty we have proposed would call for another Munich. That is not true. He also said it would be virtually unpolicable. That is not so. He also said it would not interfere with the Russian program. That is not so. Each of those statements by Dr. Teller is a flagrant violation of fact. Even worse is his calling upon "all patriotic Congressmen" to oppose the test-ban treaty itself. I consider myself as patriotic an American as Dr. Teller; and I have no hesitation in stating that the preponderance of scientific opinion is strongly against him. For my part, I hope all clear-thinking Members of both Houses of Congress will rally in support of the test ban proposed by the President of the United States, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of State, and the Chief of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. One can be sure that the Secretary of Defense did not act without adequate consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sixth, I should like to state the direct advantages to the United States of the test ban treaty proposed at Geneva by the President.

First, it would give us dependable assurance that no atmospheric underwater, or outer space testing would occur. All such testing can be reliably detected by stations outside the boundaries of the Soviet Union.

Second, it would give us dependable assurance that no high yield series of underground tests would occur, because tests underground of nuclear weapons above the 3 kiloton measurement would readily be detected by existing seismic detection stations if conducted underground.

Third, it would give reasonable assurance that no series of tests of small nuclear weapons below 3 kiloton measurement would occur underground without detection.

My seventh point is that the Soviets did not, as has been frequently averred, break a test ban agreement in 1961. In point of fact, there was no such agreement at that time. There was a moratorium which had been participated in by both the United States and Soviet Russia, but we terminated that moratorium when President Eisenhower, in December of 1959, more than a year before the Soviets resumed testing, stated that, so far as we were concerned, we

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carried out its responsibility to review the detailed support of Boeing's cost proposal, and to review Boeing's procedures for satisfying itself that the subcontract costs in its proposal were based on the latest available cost data.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASTES \$1.2 MILLION IN FIRE EXTINGUISHER PROCUREMENT

Mr. Speaker, in his report to the Congress on March 29, the Comptroller General disclosed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers incurred unnecessary costs of more than \$1.2 million in the procurement of new, higher priced, portable fire extinguishers.

The Comptroller General charged that the Army authorized wide usage of these new high-cost fire extinguishers without properly evaluating the benefits to be obtained in relation to the increased costs involved. As a result, large numbers of the new type extinguisher were procured and issued for use even though a subsequent study indicated that substantially less expensive extinguishers would have been adequate.

This new type of extinguisher was adopted by the Army in May 1959, for use in fighting liquid-fuel and electrical fires. A Corps of Engineers report on the new extinguisher stated that its estimated cost was the same as the cost of the item replaced.

Mr. Speaker, it is a proven fact that the average procurement cost of the new extinguisher was \$20.19 compared with a cost of \$13 for extinguishers identical to those already in use.

By October 1959, the Corps of Engineers had decided to replace 16 other fire extinguisher models with the new type of extinguisher without evaluating the benefits to be obtained in relation to the relatively high cost of the new extinguisher.

Mr. Speaker, had the Corps of Engineers continued to use the completely adequate current models, their procurement costs for the 102,678 extinguishers in question would have been \$849,147. The Army chose, however, to purchase the new extinguishers at a cost of \$2,073,295, which represented wholly unnecessary excess costs to the Government of \$1,224,148.

The Comptroller General pointed out that a fundamental management failure occurred in this procurement, in that a program was adopted and allowed to proceed without followup evaluations to assure that the costs involved were warranted in relation to the actual benefits obtained. A timely comparison of planned costs with the actual costs being incurred would have shown at a much earlier date the need for a critical review of the program. Had this review been made, a substantial part of the excess cost could have been avoided.

Mr. Speaker, the collusion and connivance between U.S. procurement officials and business firms has reached alarming proportions.

The Comptroller General's reports themselves cannot cure this evil. There must be a fixing of responsibility and accountability; appropriate disciplinary action by all departments; and a strict enforcement of the applicable civil and criminal laws.

All the criminal laws written will not deter crime or protect the public interest without effective enforcement agencies, procedures, and actions. These abuses can only be deterred by making examples of the offenders.

The repeated shocking losses and wastages in our military procurement clearly indicate that the present corrective measures being taken by our responsible officials are inadequate and ineffective.

low standard of living provide fertile areas for Communist infiltration. Weak governments, influenced by selfish leaders, have retarded progress. Even in a country as friendly to the United States as Brazil has been for the last 150 years or more, there is today a threat of a Communist takeover. Guatemala is also in peril. Argentina and Chile have had their Communist troubles, too. It certainly is time for a much more forceful policy toward Communist sabotage and subversion than the United States has thus far been willing to adopt.

Foreign policy in this field, both under the present and preceding administrations here, has been based on a belief that the Organization of American States can be made to function as a kind of supervisory police body which would employ armed forces in a collective manner. But almost every one of the Latin American countries faces such a serious threat from within that it is doubtful whether any firm policy which really comes to grips with the Communist problem will ever materialize through the OAS. The United States bears the major responsibility, and must go it alone when it becomes necessary. That time has arrived.

It will be argued, of course, that public opinion in Latin America is opposed to any armed intervention by this country, and that the Communists will capitalize on such a step. But although the Latin countries were at first dismayed by the attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs, many of the leaders of various governments to the south of us now have seen the light and want Cuba freed from the Communist yoke by any means possible.

The United States inevitably has to take the risk of offending the Kremlin, and can adopt the very contention that nations have put forward in the past—respect for international rights. To protect American property by force, if necessary, is a right granted under international law. It involves a decision that has to be made sooner or later. Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has maintained that no European power shall be permitted to establish a base or its "system" in this hemisphere. Historical precedent under international law therefore would justify a move to rid Cuba of Communist troops, technicians and subversive organizations as well.

What the United States does or fails to do in Cuba is directly related to the future freedom of all the Latin American peoples. The cry will be raised that intervention could bring on World War III. But a Communist takeover of Latin America, including Mexico, would mean a world war just the same. So it's a question of not what shall be done, but when. All signs today point to a Communist conquest of the Latin countries of this hemisphere if the United States continues to wait for the weak Organization of American States to act, or mistakenly delays action until the Communists have built another wall around all of Latin America just as they have around West Berlin.

Cuba is the natural place for an early showdown with communism in this hemisphere.

Special Captive Nations Committee

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CLARK MacGREGOR

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 9, 1963

Mr. MACGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend our colleagues Congressman DANIEL J. FLOOD and Congressman

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI and the many other Members who are dedicated to the establishment of a Special House Committee on Captive Nations.

I support House Resolution 14 which would establish the special committee. This action is clearly in the interests of the United States and will help to fulfill our real responsibility to those persons living under the domination of foreign powers.

There is one additional point that needs to be made and to which I want to give special attention today. It is now evident that Cuba is a captive nation in every sense of the word. We should now add Cuba to the group of nations whose people no longer have the opportunity to determine their own form of government or to participate in the day-to-day procedures of their governing authorities.

As free citizens we in this country must come to recognize that the captive nations as a group constitute not only a primary deterrent against a hot global war and further overt aggression by Moscow's totalitarian imperialism but also a prime positive means for the advance of world freedom.

The international Communist organization has consistently shown that it fears a growing world knowledge of and interest in the captive nations. Advancement of this kind of factual understanding serves to explode the myths of Soviet unity and exposes the true meaning of imperialist totalitarianism and economic colonialism throughout those areas controlled by communism.

We need to do everything we can to bring the facts to all the world. I am proud to give my support to House Resolution 14 and I urge my colleagues to do the same and I respectfully urge on the President of the United States to affirm his support.

The Nurse Everyone Needs

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN V. LINDSAY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 9, 1963

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, recently there came to my attention an excellent pamphlet entitled "The Nurse Everyone Needs," which was published by Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 22 East 38th Street, New York City, in cooperation with the National Association for Practical Nurse Education and Service, Inc., of New York City. The author is Mrs. Marguerite Clark, nationally known medical and science writer who was for 20 years the medicine editor of Newsweek magazine.

Without inserting into the RECORD the entire pamphlet, I am, with the permission of the Speaker of the House, inserting in the RECORD the highlights of the pamphlet. Members of the House will find interesting the facts and figures and information about the training of

practical nurses in the United States today.

The material follows:

THE NURSE EVERYONE NEEDS

Of the nurses in the United States today, about 220,000 bear the label "practical." The licensed practical nurse is in demand in hospitals, nursing homes, private homes, public health agencies, visiting nurse agencies, Federal services, doctors' offices, school infirmaries, summer camps, and in industry.

The public image of the early practical nurse as a carpet-slipped Mother Hubbard-clad, "Sairy Gamp" woman-of-all-work, undoubtedly was true in isolated cases. But it is definitely not true of the modern brisk uniformed LPN of today. At that, recognition has not been easy. It has come through the well-planned, energetic, organized effort of State and national nursing organizations.

The practical nurse got her first real chance during the Second World War with its increased demands for well-trained nurses. But even before the war a quiet campaign for formal PN training was underway.

In 1940, at a professional nursing convention in Philadelphia, Hilda Torrop and her associates founded the National Association for Practical Nurse Education and Service, Inc., as a national nonprofit organization to help fill the need for more nurses and to establish better standards for PN education. At that time there were only about 150 practical nursing schools in the United States. Most of them were poorly organized and directed. Standards were low, and few States had licensing laws. Under the vigorous direction of Miss Torrop and other pioneers in nursing administration, practical nursing programs were extended and better training schools were established.

The real break came when practical nursing attracted the interest of the U.S. Office of Education. Vocational schools for PN's were enlarged, new ones started, and a Practical Nursing Education Service was established in the Office of Education, with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In 1956, Public Law No. 811, passed by Congress and signed by President Eisenhower, directed improvement and expansion of the practical nursing program and appropriated \$25 million for the work.

Today, there are more than 700 State-approved schools. Every State has a law that governs the licensed practical nurse. Four types of schools offer training facilities: (1) vocational public schools (as part of the vocational or adult educational program); (2) junior colleges, private schools, or universities; (3) hospitals; and (4) private agencies.

There are no approved correspondence courses in practical nursing. Such graduates are not eligible for State licenses because courses by mail cannot include clinical or actual nursing experience with patients, which the students must have.

To make sure that the practical nursing student received proper training in the basic nursing skills needed for daily care of patients, the original LPN training program was divided into two sections:

1. Sixty-four hours of classroom instruction, including how the body is built and works, conditions of illness, mother and baby care, nutrition and special diets.

2. Two hundred and forty fours of clinical care in a convenient hospital where the student puts into practice the things she has learned in the classroom.

Today, the LPN standard training has changed somewhat. The once sharp line drawn between the preclinical classroom period and the clinical period at the patient's bedside in a hospital, has been softened.

More and more, the LPN is learning her profession by doing, all through her schooling.

Typical of this modern, efficient LPN education, is that offered at the Hospital for Special Surgery School of Practical Nursing, started in 1955, in the 170-bed orthopedic and rheumatic disease hospital on East 70th Street in New York City.

"Ours is an integrated course of study," said Miss Dean Smith, director of nursing education at the hospital. "We combine clinical and practical training in one overall experience that will make quite clear to the student exactly what she is being taught and why. *** Our purpose is to produce the best bedside nurses we can."

The student to be must decide on the kind of school she wishes to attend—vocational, junior college or university, or hospital.

The acceptable age range is wide, from 17 or 18 to 45 or sometimes 50, for both men and women. Male applicants, unfortunately, are scarce despite the fact that men make good LPN's. They are needed, and there are many jobs open for them.

While no special subjects are required for admission, applicants under 35 years of age must have completed 2 years of high school. Some States require high school graduation. Proof of graduation from the eighth grade is accepted for women over 35.

Salaries depend on the part of the country in which the LPN works and on the location, hospital, nursing home, public health agency, or industry. On the staff of a large city hospital, the LPN starts with a salary of \$2,500 to \$3,000 a year, or even higher. Private duty LPN's earn \$10 to \$14 for 8 hours. In Government hospitals and health agencies, the pay is higher. Federal civil service appointments in these agencies paid \$3,760 in 1961.

"What the practical nurse needs most of all is a stabilization of her role, so she will know exactly where she stands," said Eleanor Gaffney, president of the National Association for Practical Nurse Education and Service, Inc. "Just now, in the hospitals in any one city, we may find policies and varying levels of acceptance of what a practical nurse may do, can do, and should do. This variation exists in spite of the fact that present training programs prepare the practical nurse in the basic sciences, the nursing arts, rehabilitation techniques, pharmacology, and administration of medicine. The true role of the LPN (licensed practical nurse) must be faced squarely and honestly. It is for bedside nursing that she is being trained; it is her greatest job satisfaction, and it is there she is most needed."

Some 25,000 practical nurses will graduate this year, but it is estimated that the current need is for 200,000 every year. With some 27 million patients requiring but not getting longtime nursing care, this need is critical.

"All over the country, there are those in pain, desperate for help, children, old people, mentally ill, crippled, convalescent, victims of accidents and chronically ill, sending out cries for nursing care," said Hilda Torrop.

"At the same time, we have a large and tragic number of unemployed; we have hundreds of thousands of high school graduates looking for jobs, and yet we have a desperate national shortage of nurses. How can you reconcile these opposing factors?"

"The speediest way to eliminate this shortage," said Miss Torrop, "is to get more practical nurses into the field."

"Thousands of young women just out of high school seeking careers, the mature men and women who must find work, these people are magnificent potentials for the vocation of LPN. Just think, 1 year's training, and you have a job for life, one you can

There were no certified specialists in Belmont County before the clinic opened (although there were some in Wheeling), and Mr. Cinque has a low opinion of specialists generally. "They can't perform anything but their specialty," he says. "I don't want specialists for myself personally. I'll take the general practitioner any day. If he wants help (from a specialist) fine."

Board certification of specialists "means nothing to us, and should mean nothing to anyone," Mr. Cinque said. "There are two physicians and surgeons in this institution that could be members of three different colleges (of specialists) if they were willing to take the time to get certified."

Mr. Cinque calls the UMW welfare fund a "horrible waste," and adds: "We don't want to deal with the welfare fund. We don't want to deal with people who are autocratic. The miners' welfare fund isn't going to tell me what I can do in my hospital." The hospital does, however, take welfare fund patients.

Thus Bellaire's medical future is being fought out. The community as a whole seems unperturbed. But whatever the deeper implications of the issues, the feeling seems to be that Dr. Sams should be permitted to deliver babies in City Hospital.

Truth in Packaging

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER
OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 9, 1963

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, it is a source of real satisfaction to me that my hometown paper, the Watertown (Wis.) Daily Times, has commented strongly in an editorial of April 2, 1963, on the need for truth-in-packaging legislation. I, along with many others in both the House and the Senate, have introduced a truth-in-packaging bill, and chances for passage of the bill seem bright. Public awareness of the bill, and the benefits it would provide to consumers throughout the Nation, is a necessary prerequisite to the success of this legislation. It is responsible journalism, such as the Watertown Daily Times has shown in the editorial reprinted below, that will arouse the support of the people for the truth-in-packaging bill.

The editorial follows:

TRUTH IN PACKAGING

The bogeyman of big government is being used in an attempt to frighten the public away from truth-in-packaging legislation. People are being told that a law such as that now being considered in Congress would be just one more way of giving the Washington bureaucracy control over the lives of Americans. It also is being said that control over packaging would be a blow to free enterprise.

It would be nothing of the sort, unless by free enterprise is meant the sort of "let the buyer beware" enterprise that Americans have long since decided not to tolerate. The truth-in-packaging legislation is intended to do just what the name suggests—to make processors and manufacturers of consumer goods sell their products in honest packages which tell the consumer exactly what, and how much, is inside.

This would obviously involve an extension of Government control. But a more sensible way of looking at this aspect of the matter is that the truth-in-packaging law would enable the consumer, through Government, to do something that he cannot do on his own. The present hodgepodge of packaging, confusing at best and at worst thoroughly deceptive, cannot be improved unless reasonable standards are established and enforced.

Processors insist that an industry code would do the trick without a law. Past experience gives little reason to suppose that an industry code would give the consumer the sort of protection he ought to have. Many firms voluntarily provide high quality, full measure, and honest labeling, but some do not. It is the latter that make the truth-in-packaging legislation necessary for consumer protection.

Support President Kennedy on Cuba

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Tuesday, April 9, 1963

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, we have all heard of rocking-chair military strategists and world affairs experts—in by-gone days these were favorite phrases of silver-tongued orators. Today, we hear less of these sonorous sounds but, alas, we have many more examples of such postures before us. Many people in public life, whose responsibilities of office demand the greatest objectivity, seem to have engaged in all manner of shouts and cries for "more action" or "less action" in hit-and-miss fashion when the seriousness of the situation surrounding us demands the utmost in dedication and constructive effort.

How gratifying, then, to come across a statement recently issued at Bal Harbour, Fla., by the AFL-CIO Executive Council urging support of our President.

Under unanimous consent, Mr. Speaker, I share this important statement with my colleagues by placing it in the RECORD, as follows:

SUPPORT PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON CUBA

Every American is deeply concerned over the Kremlin's transformation of Cuba into a heavily armed base for Communist subversion and sabotage. The American people are as one in the condemnation of the Communist yoke forced on the Cuban nation. We are all agreed that, in the interest of world peace and freedom, Cuba must be returned to the Cuban people so that they can build their homeland into a healthy democracy.

It is understandable that there may be differences of opinion in our country regarding our Government's policies for achieving these objectives. The exchange or even clash of opinions over important policies is an integral part of the democratic process. American labor would vigorously oppose any effort to silence criticism. However, the executive council of the AFL-CIO views with considerable concern the intense partisanship which has been injected into the debate over Cuba by some opponents of the administration.

As the Chief Executive of the Nation and as the Commander in Chief of all our Armed Forces, the President of the United States is

the principal architect and executor of our country's foreign policy. Given the seriousness of the worldwide Soviet imperialist threat and the multiplying dangers of Communist subversion, especially in Latin America, the responsibilities of the President in meeting the Cuban problem are particularly heavy. In this critical situation, destructive criticism—like broadcasting suspicions about unfounded deals with Moscow—can only add to the enormous difficulties confronting the President in his efforts to preserve the security and freedom of our country by peaceful means, if at all possible, and by all means, if necessary. Former President Eisenhower served the Nation well when he recently stressed the overriding importance of bipartisanship in the conduct of our Nation's foreign policy.

Only blind political partisanship can disparage the great significance and beneficial results of President Kennedy's courageous and decisive action in forcing the Soviet Union to dismantle and withdraw its emplaced rockets from Cuba. Such partisanship can only hurt the international prestige of our country and the effectiveness of our Government's efforts to eliminate entirely the Soviet exploitation of Cuba as a base for Communist subversion and Muscovite provocations in the New World.

Such short-sighted political partisanship tends to spread confusion and distrust among the people. Anxious to prevent the sapping of public confidence in the administration, officials occupying even very sensitive Government posts have been drawn into disclosing vital security information. When the debate takes such a costly turn, the best interests of our Nation are not helped but hampered. All of this tends to divide the American people where there is no cause for division and when there is every reason for unity.

Furthermore, those who play with the Cuban problem, as if it were a political football, undermine the unity of freedom-loving Cubans everywhere and weaken their confidence in the determination and capacity of the United States to help them regain their national independence and to build a healthy democracy.

Since last October, when Khrushchev was forced to back down in the face of superior American strength, our Government has engaged in effective aerial surveillance of Cuba. President Kennedy's unrelenting pressure on the Kremlin to withdraw its troops from Cuba has begun to show results. The Organization of American States (OAS) is demonstrating greater vigilance and effectiveness in meeting the dangerous sabotage campaign launched from Cuba under Soviet direction. The economic measures taken by our Government against Castro are dealing his dictatorship telling blows.

Senators, Congressmen, Governors, and Government officials—like all other patriotic citizens—can serve our country best by proposing constructive measures for the complete elimination of the threat of Communist subversion and Soviet provocations based in Castro Cuba. Toward this end, the AFL-CIO Executive Council reiterates the specific proposals it made at its meeting of November 13, 1962. We quote in part:

"Our Government can count on the whole-hearted and active support of the AFL-CIO in—

"Accelerating its efforts to insure American military superiority.

"Continuing aerial surveillance of Cuba until such time as U.N. inspection or, as President Kennedy has proposed, any other 'Equally satisfactory means of international verification is effected.'

"Making clear and emphasizing through radio and other channels, our friendship for the people of Cuba, our determination to see them free of all foreign domination and

exploitation, our readiness to help them overcome their present miserable economic conditions and enjoy the benefits of the Alliance for Progress program, once they establish a government of their own choice through free elections."

We earnestly plead for an end to all partisanship. We urge the unification of the entire Nation under the courageous and capable leadership of President Kennedy.

Legislative Reapportionment

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JULIA BUTLER HANSEN

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 9, 1963

Mrs. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I have received House Joint Memorial No. 1 from the Legislature of the State of Washington, and also a letter from the secretary of state which states:

As you undoubtedly know, one of the thorny problems which seems impossible to resolve by the legislature, in its extraordinary session, is the problem of reapportionment. As a matter of fact, at the time of writing this letter it seems most probable that the legislature will give up in despair and report to the Federal District Court that a reapportionment cannot be agreed upon.

The attached certified copy of House Joint Memorial 1 reflects the thinking of the current legislature, in that it proposes an amendment to the Constitution of the United States limiting the judicial power of the United States relating to reapportionment, and it is at the direction of the legislature that I am sending you this memorial.

Since I am sure this is a subject of more than passing interest to other Members of Congress, I trust they will take time to read this memorial forwarded by the Legislature of the State of Washington, the text of which follows:

HOUSE JOINT MEMORIAL 1

To the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress assembled:

Resolved, That we, your memorialists, the House of Representatives and Senate of the State of Washington, in legislative session assembled, respectfully petition that the Congress of the United States call a convention for the purpose of proposing the following articles as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. No provision of this Constitution, or any amendment thereto, shall restrict or limit any State in which the people have the right of initiative in the apportionment of representation in its legislature.

"SEC. 2. The judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suit in law or equity, or to any controversy, relating to apportionment of representation in a State legislature in a State in which the people have the right of initiative.

"SEC. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission."

Be it further resolved, That, if Congress shall have proposed an amendment to the

Constitution identical with that contained in this memorial prior to January 1, 1965, this application for a convention shall no longer be of any force or effect; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this memorial be immediately transmitted by the secretary of state to the Secretary of the Senate of the United States, the Clerk of the House of Representatives of the United States and to each Member of the Congress from this State.

Passed the house March 28, 1963.

WILLIAM S. DAY.

Speaker of the House.

Passed the senate March 30, 1963.

JOHN A. CHERBERG.

President of the Senate.

The Cuban Situation

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. BRUCE ALGER

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 9, 1963

Mr. ALGER. Mr. Speaker, nobody has written with more urgency or clearer perception of the administration's inadequacies in the Cuban situation than columnist David Lawrence.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I include in the RECORD three of Mr. Lawrence's recent columns on this subject: *POLICY ON CUBA ENCOURAGES REDS IN LATIN AMERICA*

(By David Lawrence)

Will the United States permit a complete Communist takeover of Central and South America similar to what has already happened in Cuba?

One by one, the Latin-American countries are currently being subjected to the most intensive penetration by the Soviet Government. What is the answer?

It will be of no avail to blame a preceding administration. There is an unfortunate tendency in Washington nowadays to condone evil by enumerating mistakes of the past as if these furnish an alibi for present errors or neglect of duty.

The problem is really nonpolitical. It is every day becoming more difficult to handle. Billions of dollars are being taken away from the taxpayers of the United States annually to support so-called foreign aid programs on all continents. Almost everyone familiar with the situation agrees that financial aid of some kind from the United States is essential to thwart the Communist intrusions in the internal affairs of various countries to the south of us. When the United States lends or gives money to another country, however, the Washington Government cannot exercise complete control over what happens to such funds.

Also, the Communists train stooges in Moscow and send them back to their native lands to convert their fellow countrymen or to engage in an obstructionist-type of political activity that checkmates progress even when American money for worthy objects is made available.

The fundamental weakness in the situation today is the failure of the U.S. Government to adopt a resolute policy toward the Communist invasion of this hemisphere. The inclination here has been to avoid a showdown on the vague ground that commitments in other parts of the world may be endangered. But many times in world history, procrastination and timidity have re-

sulted in bringing on the very conflict that a policy of forbearance was aimed to avoid.

The spread of communism in Latin America is due largely to economic conditions that have long prevailed there. Poverty and a low standard of living provide fertile areas for Communist infiltration. Weak governments, influenced by selfish leaders, have retarded progress. Even in a country as friendly to the United States as Brazil has been for the past 150 years or more, there is today a threat of a Communist takeover. Guatemala is also in peril. Argentina and Chile have had their Communist troubles, too. It certainly is time for a much more forceful policy toward Communist sabotage and subversion than the United States has thus far been willing to adopt.

Foreign policy in this field, both under the present and preceding administrations here, has been based on a belief that the Organization of American States can be made to function as a kind of supervisory police body which would employ armed forces in a collective manner. But almost every one of the Latin American countries faces such a serious threat from within that it is doubtful whether any firm policy which really comes to grips with the Communist problem will ever materialize through the OAS. The United States bears the major responsibility, and must go it alone when it becomes necessary. That time has arrived.

It will be argued, of course, that public opinion in Latin America is opposed to any armed intervention by this country, and the Communists will capitalize on such a step. But although the Latin countries were at first dismayed by the attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs, many of the leaders of various governments to the south of us now have seen the light and went Cuba freed from the Communist yoke by any means possible.

The United States inevitably has to take the risk of offending the Kremlin, and can adopt the very contention that nations have put forward in the past—respect for international rights. To protect American property by force, if necessary, is a right granted under international law. It involves a decision that has to be made sooner or later. Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has maintained that no European power shall be permitted to establish a base or its system in this hemisphere. Historical precedent under international law therefore would justify a move to rid Cuba of Communist troops, technicians, and subversive organizations as well.

What the United States does or fails to do in Cuba is directly related to the future freedom of all the Latin-American peoples. The cry will be raised that intervention could bring on world war III. But a Communist takeover of Latin America, including Mexico, would mean a world war just the same. So it's a question of not what shall be done, but when. All signs today point to a Communist conquest of the Latin countries of this hemisphere if the United States continues to wait for the weak Organization of American States to act, or mistakenly delays action until the Communists have built another wall around all of Latin America just as they have around West Berlin.

Cuba is the natural place for an early showdown with communism in this hemisphere.

PARADOX IN CUBA POLICY LOOKS TIMID TO LATINS

(By David Lawrence)

WASHINGTON.—Thousands of Soviet troops are apparently going to remain in Cuba indefinitely, and the U.S. Government evidently isn't going to do anything about it but write notes. While the number of "withdrawals" is announced, no official information is forthcoming as to the number of replacements.

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For all the members of the Soviet Army in Cuba wear civilian clothes.

There seems, moreover, to be a tacit and unwritten agreement that not only will there no invasion of Cuba by this country but that the Soviet Army on the Island and Castro troops will be protected by the United States against all outside attacks or invasions.

This paradox is occurring while tens of millions of dollars are spent annually to create abroad an "image" of the United States that will command respect and support as against Communist imperialism. Billions are about to be spent, also, in Latin America by our Government in the battle against communism. Psychological warfare is today almost as important, if not more so, than diplomacy used to be.

But what kind of image is the United States creating in Latin America? And who is creating that image? It is not the official information agency, with its managed broadcasts, but the White House and State Department, which can by their acts and pronouncements produce unfavorable impressions on the peoples of other countries.

The President has just directed that the Cuban exiles be prevented from liberating their fellow citizens by any acts initiated inside this country. This is a role of neutralism in the Western Hemisphere in place of the Monroe Doctrine. The explanation given by President Kennedy is that otherwise there might possibly be serious complications for the United States in Europe. This view, however, has already been interpreted in Latin America as a policy of timidity and fear. It is regarded as an abandonment of Cuba to Castro—as a means of strengthening him. The administration here may protest that this is farthest from its thoughts, but the policy may have that effect just the same.

EXILES CONFUSED

The people of Latin America know the difference between resoluteness and irresoluteness. If it is a violation of the neutrality laws of the United States, for instance, to allow expeditions to take the big risks that exiled Cubans wish to take to carry on forays along the coast of Cuba, then, it is asked, why does the U.S. Government keep on making unneutral statements that tell those same Cuban exiles to look forward to revolution as a means of liberation? Such declarations were repeated several times by the administration in recent months. This had a profound effect on the anti-Castro Cubans. They came to believe that the U.S. Government is behind them. But what do they see now? The Washington administration not only orders the Cubans seized if they try to launch any military raids from this country, but it has persuaded the British Government also to seize raiders.

Will the Latin American governments now feel morally bound to adopt the same course that Washington has urged on Great Britain? Will the Latin American governments be requested by the United States to prevent the use of their territory as a base of operations for the Cuban exiles?

The psychological effect of the latest turn in the Kennedy-Rusk policies can only be damaging and discouraging to the people inside Latin America who have no illusions about the problem of Communist infiltration or Castro's deliberate attempts to subvert many countries in this hemisphere in aid of Communist objectives.

While the raids launched against Cuba would themselves be mere pinpricks or ineffective, as President Kennedy sees it, it is out of such valiant and sacrificial expeditions that the spirit of revolution is stimulated and the morale of the insurgents is heightened. They have, moreover, a decided impact inside a country where a dictatorship is in power.

VAGUE FEARS

The image of weakness which the U.S. Government is creating for itself abroad with respect to Cuba is in large part due to the openly but vaguely expressed fear of international complications. This seems to accompany almost every move of American foreign policy nowadays where Cuba is concerned. The failure of the Soviet Government to withdraw all its troops from Cuba, after 5 months of note writing between Moscow and Washington, is being treated here with faint words of remonstrance. The fact that a European power has violated the Monroe Doctrine and maintains any troops or weapons on Cuban soil has been dealt with gently by the Washington Government.

To those who constantly talk of escalation and the dangers of nuclear war, all this may seem expedient. But it is precisely the kind of appeasement that has led to war in the past. Indeed, the administration's policy is not only presenting in Latin America an image of fear of Castro and the Soviets on the part of the United States, but it could have the dangerous effect of making the people of Western Europe, as well as the captive peoples of Eastern Europe, also believe that, when the chips are down, the United States will not pursue firm policies against Soviet aggression anywhere.

Communication—A Statement on the Test Ban Treaty

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 9, 1963

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, the long and arduous negotiations toward a treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons has now reached a critical stage. We are at the point where a workable treaty is in sight; the outstanding difference between ourselves and the Russians is now over the relatively minor question of the number of onsite inspections.

The burden of the problem is now being shifted from the scientists to the legislators. For this reason it is vital that we understand the factors involved in a test-ban treaty, and that the fog of misunderstanding—whether deliberate or accidental—be dispersed. To help clarify the issues I should like to insert in the RECORD this communication to the Washington Post, from nine distinguished American scientists, published in the Post on April 9, 1963.

I would particularly like to draw attention to the following points which they make: First, the United States and the Soviet Union are able to destroy one another regardless of how much their nuclear arsenals are expanded; second, the Soviet Union has more to gain from unrestricted nuclear testing than we do because they are further behind in nuclear technology; third, our own experts have stated that underground testing is of little military value; and fourth, adequate safeguards now exist for a workable test ban treaty which would end

atomic fallout and help slow down the arms race.

The article follows:

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1963]
A COMMUNICATION: STATEMENT ON THE TEST-BAN TREATY

In view of recent controversy concerning the desirability of concluding a nuclear test-ban treaty with the Soviet Union, we wish to make the following statement in support of the efforts of the U.S. Government to conclude such a treaty as soon as it can be negotiated.

Our primary reason for support lies in the fact that a test-ban treaty is in the best interests of the United States and of world peace. A treaty would reduce the speed of the present arms race, inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear powers, reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, and prevent the extension of the hazards of fallout. We therefore commend the President of the United States for his sincere attempt to reach a workable agreement with the Soviet Union on a test ban, and urge that Members of the U.S. Congress and of the general public consider the question of the test-ban treaty in the light of scientific fact and rational argument rather than in terms of partisan politics.

Unfortunately, public debate on the issue has been confused in recent weeks by some Members of Congress and by public figures who have attacked the test-ban treaty by spreading a completely false view of the test-ban situation. They also would appear to be operating on the fallacious assumption that American security can best be maintained by unlimited development of our nuclear weapons capability no matter what the other nations may be free to do in this regard. The attackers have failed to recognize the clear fact that once the overkill capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States have reached their present level—and hardened missile bases are in place, making a successful disarming attack impossible for either side—an increase in nuclear capacity by one side or the other does not upset the balance of deterrence.

DETERRENCE REMAINS

Even though we probably possess between three to eight times as much intercontinental nuclear weapons capability as the Soviet Union, we would still have little chance of escaping an incredibly destructive retaliation were we to strike first with our strategic force. Since the smaller Soviet force is enough to deter us from a nuclear attack on the Soviets, a considerable change in force levels would still leave us with more than sufficient force to deter the Soviets from making a nuclear attack on us.

The opponents of the test ban treaty also base their argument on the fallacious assumption that any attempt on our part to negotiate with the Soviet Union means that we are taking a soft political line and making dangerous concessions. The treaty opponents therefore consider any lowering of the number of on-site inspections by the United States simply as a sign of weakness and of yielding to the advantage of the Soviet Union, rather than as realistic negotiation to improve national security. In fact, during the period since the test ban discussions began in 1958, detection techniques have been rapidly improving and may be expected to improve still further. It is now possible to detect many of the explosions within a given country by stations outside that country, and the number of on-site inspections required for checking the identification of earthquakes versus explosions has been greatly reduced. Research has also shown that there are many fewer earthquakes in the Soviet Union than was formerly thought, thus making a reduction

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In the possibility of their being confused with nuclear tests.

The strategy of the opponents of a treaty is to exaggerate the risks of clandestine testing and to minimize the risks of a continuing nuclear arms race. Among the most flagrant violations of fact which they have publicized in these matters are the recent statements by Dr. Edward Teller that a test ban agreement "would be virtually unpoliced" and "would not interfere with Russian progress," and Senator Dodd's claim that the test ban policy of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations "has already cost us our nuclear superiority over the Soviets."

MISSTATEMENT CHARGED

In making this claim, Senator Dodd is completely misstating the facts as set forth by responsible Department of Defense officials. If the Soviets learned more than we did in the 1961-62 testing and narrowed the gap between us, it was because they had more to learn. There is every reason to believe that they would have narrowed the gap even more rapidly had there not been a moratorium and had there been continuous testing on both sides after 1958. Conversely, if we had been able to conclude a test ban treaty in 1959, the Russian tests of 1961-62 would not have taken place and we would still have our great superiority of nuclear weapons technology. By no stretch of the imagination could these tests have been carried out secretly underground.

The direct advantages to the United States of a test ban treaty are these:

1. Dependable assurance that no atmospheric testing, which is the really important kind, is taking place.

2. Reasonable assurance that underground testing of small nuclear weapons is not taking place.

What assurance do we have that in the event of a test ban treaty the Soviet Union would not conduct secret underground tests?

Even though a single small test might be concealed by being confused with an earthquake if the test were conducted in a region of frequent earthquake occurrences, any significant series of tests would be almost impossible to conceal.

RISK IS EMPHASIZED

It is extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union would be willing to risk the breakdown of the treaty for the marginal gain they might achieve by testing explosions small enough to escape detection. It is important to recall that American nuclear weapons experts insisted that underground testing was of little value for military purposes when, in 1961, our testing was temporarily limited to underground explosions. We have additional assurance in the fact that the Soviet Union has agreed to three on-site inspections should suspicious indications of underground testing be discovered by the detection system of the United States and the United Kingdom, and is willing to permit a number of automatic seismic stations on Soviet territory.

The Soviets surprised us by starting big atmospheric tests in 1961 when we thought at that time they would continue negotiations for a test ban treaty. The opponents of a present treaty now claim that this means the Soviets broke a test ban agreement in 1961. On this basis they warn against entering another agreement. It is too often forgotten that there was no test ban agreement (much less a treaty) in 1961, and that President Eisenhower, on December 29, 1959, terminated the 1-year informal moratorium by announcing, "The voluntary moratorium on testing will expire on December 31." Even though the Soviets and most other nations have broken treaties, a test ban treaty would be very different from a mere cessation of tests, particularly if adhered to by an increasing number of nations, because it would be in the interest of the United States

and the Soviet Union to abide by it. To be on the safe side, our developments and preparations would continue as far as possible without testing, and there should be no doubt that American testing would be resumed if the Soviets should break the treaty by again resuming tests in the atmosphere.

Even if the treaty should be abrogated after a time or should fail to develop into a world test ban because of the recalcitrance of France or China, it would not have interfered with our nuclear development appreciably more than the Soviets. The treaty would emphasize above all the common interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in trying to avoid nuclear war.

In summary, the test-ban treaty, as proposed, will stop atmospheric testing as long as the treaty is in effect. It will leave some uncertainty about very small tests (one ten-thousandth the size of the H-bomb) but could reasonably be expected to deter the Soviets from even small-scale cheating (a) because it would teach them relatively little, (b) because of the serious risk of being caught and (c) because there are good reasons for the Soviets to want the treaty to function.

Careful studies by the foremost experts in the United States and by the President's advisers on national security, including those in the Defense Department, have furnished the conclusion that the risk of continuing the arms race without a test-ban treaty is considerably more than the risk that such a treaty might be violated by secret testing. We support the President in this conclusion and believe that once the Members of Congress and the people of the United States are aware of the realities of our present situation and of the facts of the test-ban case, that they too will support the President in his effort to find answers to the greatest question before the world today—the question of survival.

Dr. Bernard Feld, Department of Physics, MIT; Dr. David Inglis, Argonne National Laboratories, Argonne, Ill.; Dr. James Watson, Department of Biology, Harvard University; Dr. Bruno Rossi, Laboratory for Nuclear Science, MIT; Dr. Donald Glaser, Department of Physics, University of California; Dr. Hans Bethe, Department of Physics, Cornell University; Dr. Freeman Dyson, Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton University; Dr. Francis Low, Department of Physics, MIT; Dr. K. T. Bainbridge, Department of Physics, Harvard University.

Washington Star Calls Wild Animal Conservation an Evident Need

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. HENRY S. REUSS

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 18, 1963

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 107 is needed to provide a new impetus to efforts to save imperiled wild animals throughout the world.

The severity of the threat to our animal resources is not widely recognized. Neither do we pay sufficient attention to the human, ethical, and economic values that will be lost if we do not act to save the world's animals.

The Washington Star has recently commented on my proposal and pointed

out that a look at the facts makes the need for action evident to anyone. I call the attention of the House to the Star's editorial, which follows:

WILDLIFE IN TROUBLE

Nearly four pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, devoted strictly to wild animals and birds, may strike some as a rather extravagant use of space. Not so Representative REUSS, of Wisconsin, and his reason becomes evident at the very outset of his well-organized remarks:

"Man has already ignobly succeeded in exterminating about 200 species of birds and animals, among them beautiful, useful and once plentiful creatures. * * * Now we recklessly threaten nearly 250 species with the same fate. These almost condemned creature include some of the most spectacular and successful animals evolved during millions of years. Yet if we continue our present course, they may be gone forever in a decade or less."

If Mr. REUSS' information is accurate (and he quotes competent authorities) this does not leave much time to insure the survival of such species as the American bald eagle (our national emblem), the California condor, polar bear, woodland caribou, trumpeter swan, giant tortoise, Arabian oryx, Ceylon elephant, Kashmir stag, wild chinchilla, Angolan giraffe and the rhinoceros, elephant and antelope of Africa, to name but a few.

To prevent the total destruction of these once-abundant birds and beasts, man must do a complete turnaround. Up to now he has wantonly killed them for sport, for fads and fancies to please his vanity (ivory, pelts, feathers, leopardskin coats and the like) and for profit by poachers, at least one of whom has made as much as \$50,000 a year.

Aside for those which every nature lover and circus fan can understand, Mr. REUSS enumerates vital reasons for putting the brakes on animal annihilation. One is the need for continued scientific study of wildlife, but more practical is the economic factor. By proper management, the fowl and fauna can become an important part of the development of many new African countries, providing under right conditions food, hides and lucrative tourist attractions.

Thus far a few organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund, have engaged in an uneven fight for preservation. Mr. REUSS has found that a realistic worldwide conservation program would cost at least \$3 million a year. For a start in that direction, he has asked Congress to authorize an international conference to set up the machinery. Principally, there would be an effort to ban or curtail imports on commodities derived from wild animals, to set up conservation schools and departments, and to give monetary aid to countries where wildlife abounds. The need for such a program should be evident to anyone who reads Mr. REUSS' treatise.

Leading Scientists Support Test Ban Treaty

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. WILLIAM FITTS RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 9, 1963

Mr. RYAN of New York. Mr. Speaker, in recent weeks the administration's proposals for a test ban treaty have generated a heated controversy in both governmental and private sectors of our